Early Democratic Foundations After World War I (1918–1920)

In the aftermath of World War I, as the Ottoman Empire’s rule collapsed, Syrians embarked on an ambitious experiment in self-determination. A geographically representative Syrian National Congress convened in Damascus in 1919–1920, bringing together Arabs of various religious and social backgrounds – including prominent Muslim and Christian leaders – to chart the country’s future. On March 8, 1920, this congress declared an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria with Emir Faisal ibn Husayn (son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca) as king. Crucially, the congress also acted as a constituent assembly to draft a national constitution. The resulting 1920 Syrian Constitution – though never fully implemented due to foreign intervention – was remarkably progressive and secular for its time. It envisioned a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and guarantees of civil equality across religious communities. The draft charter explicitly upheld justice and equality among all Syrians regardless of sect, and even debated extending women’s suffrage – a bold idea in an era when even many Western democracies had only just granted women the vote. In fact, contemporary records show that members of the Syrian Congress (such as feminist activist Mary Ajami) petitioned for women’s voting rights during the 1920 deliberations. While traditionalists voiced resistance – one cleric objected that women’s suffrage would “abolish sex segregation” and require women to appear unveiled – the very discussion of women’s rights in 1920 underscored the inclusive and forward-looking spirit of Syria’s first constitutional movement.

This brief democratic spring culminated in a constitution approved in principle by July 1920, which would have sharply limited the king’s powers under parliamentary oversight. The draft constitution guaranteed freedom of religion (Article 13) and made only a minimal reference to Islam (requiring that the king be Muslim, per Article 3). Notably, even a prominent Islamist delegate, Sheikh Rashid Rida, supported the secular tone of the document – arguing that declaring Islam the state religion would only invite foreign meddling under the pretext of “protecting minorities”. This illustrates how Syria’s Muslim leaders and Christian minority were largely united in seeking a civil, non-sectarian state. Indeed, King Faisal himself – though displeased at having his authority curtailed – acquiesced to the Congress’s democratic prerogatives. In sum, by 1920 Syrians had articulated a clear vision for a modern, liberal state with representative institutions and equal citizenship. The momentum of this moment, however, was soon cut short by European imperialism.

 

The French Mandate and the Struggle for Democracy (1920–1946)

Despite Syria’s declared independence, the country was soon occupied by France under a League of Nations Mandate, following the San Remo conference of 1920. In July 1920, French troops defeated the nascent Syrian forces at the Battle of Maysalun and forced King Faisal into exile. The French Mandate (1920–1946) proved to be a major obstacle to Syria’s democratic development. The French authorities dissolved the Syrian Congress and suspended the 1920 constitution, imposing direct colonial rule. They also pursued a classic “divide and rule” strategy: carving out separate statelets along ethnic and religious lines in an attempt to weaken Syrian unity. By the early 1920s, France had split the region into units including Damascus, Aleppo, the Alawite State on the coast, the Jabal Druze in the south, and a separate jurisdiction for Greater Lebanon. The implicit aim was to create enclaves dominated by minorities (Alawites, Druze, Christian enclaves in Lebanon) that would depend on French protection.

These attempts to partition Syria on sectarian lines backfired spectacularly. Far from embracing separation, Syrians of all backgrounds largely rejected the carve-up of their country. In 1925, a nationwide uprising known as the Great Syrian Revolt erupted against French rule. The revolt was notably inclusive: it began among Druze communities under Sultan al-Atrash’s leadership, but soon spread as Sunni, Druze, Alawite, and Christian fighters took up arms together against the mandate. This display of unity across sects underscored a key fact: Syria’s people shared a strong sense of national identity that ran deeper than religious differences. Even minority communities that the French tried to isolate – such as the Druze of Jabal al-Druze – ended up spearheading the nationalist struggle for an indivisible Syria. In Damascus, the cosmopolitan heart of the country, nationalist leaders like Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar (a Muslim) and Fares al-Khoury (a Christian) worked side by side. A famous anecdote recalls how Fares al-Khoury, a Christian statesman, boldly delivered a sermon from the pulpit of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus to affirm Muslim–Christian solidarity when the French claimed to be “protecting” Syrian Christians. Such episodes cemented the image of Damascus as a city of religious tolerance and moderate Islam, where churches and mosques stood close and communities intermingled peacefully. In fact, throughout the French Mandate period, sectarian identity remained secondary to a broader Syrian patriotism; there was “no serious domestic demand” to permanently split the country by religion or ethnicity.

Under pressure from persistent protests and political movements, the French did allow limited elections and a constitution in the 1920s and 1930s – but always under the shadow of colonial control. A constitution in 1930 (based on a 1928 draft by an elected assembly) established a parliamentary republic in theory, yet France retained ultimate power and often suspended Syrian institutions. Nonetheless, Syrian nationalists continued to agitate for true independence and democracy. By the mid-1930s, even minority enclaves were gravitating back toward a unified Syria; for example, the autonomous Alawite and Druze regions were re-incorporated into the Syrian state by 1936. The culmination of these efforts came after World War II: on April 17, 1946, France evacuated its troops and Syria finally achieved full independence. The mandate’s end was hastened by Syria’s steadfast refusal (across communal lines) to accept anything less than sovereignty. This legacy of national unity and moderate, secular politics in the face of colonial divide-and-rule would serve as a proud reference point for Syrians in the years to come.

 

Independence and the Parliamentary Era (1946–1963)

With the French gone, Syria entered its first true period of independent governance. The early post-independence years saw the establishment of a republican, parliamentary system – often referred to as Syria’s First Republic. The 1930 constitution (slightly amended) was in effect at independence, providing for an elected legislature and a president accountable to parliament. Elections were held, and leaders of the nationalist National Bloc who had fought for independence assumed power. Shukri al-Quwatli, a prominent figure of the independence movement, was elected President. Political life during 1946–1949 was relatively pluralistic, with various parties (nationalists, communists, etc.) and a free press flourishing to a degree.

However, this democratic experiment struggled under the weight of regional instability and internal power struggles. In 1949, just three years after independence, Syria experienced a series of military coups that reflected the fragility of its institutions. The first coup in March 1949 was led by General Husni al-Za’im, who overthrew President Quwatli. Al-Za’im’s regime, though short-lived (he was ousted after just 137 days), made a lasting decision by granting Syrian women the right to vote for the first time. This was a significant milestone for women’s political empowerment in Syria. Yet, al-Za’im’s dictatorship was brief – he was executed in August 1949 – and Syria then saw two more coups that year as different military factions vied for control.

By 1950, civilian politicians reasserted some authority. A new 1950 constitution was drafted by an elected assembly, and President Hashim al-Atassi (a veteran statesman from the 1920 Congress days) oversaw a return to parliamentary rule. The 1950 charter expanded civil liberties and, notably, still kept religion largely separate from state – it did not enshrine Islam as the state religion, preserving the secular character of Syrian governance. Throughout the 1950s, Syria oscillated between unstable elected governments and short-lived military juntas. Yet despite the political turbulence (including another coup in 1951 by Adib al-Shishakli, and his overthrow in 1954), Syrian society experienced what many later recalled as a golden era of relative freedom. There was a vibrant press and intellectual life, active political parties, and even the emergence of an organic feminist movement. By the mid-1950s, women had obtained universal suffrage and were participating in elections as voters and candidates.

In 1958, Syria entered a union with Egypt, forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Gamal Abdel Nasser. This was driven by pan-Arab sentiment but resulted in Syria dissolving its parties and parliament in favor of Nasser’s one-party system. The UAR experiment ended after three years when Syrian officers staged a secession coup in 1961, restoring Syrian independence (the Second Republic) and the 1950 constitution. Once again, Syria attempted a democratic reset – elections were held in 1961–1962. Yet, factionalism remained rife, and the stage was set for a decisive power grab by an ideologically driven group: the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party.

 

The Ba’ath Party Coup and the Rise of the Assad Regime (1963–2000)

On March 8, 1963, Ba’athist military officers seized power in Damascus, marking the end of Syria’s tumultuous pluralistic era. The Ba’ath Party, a pan-Arab socialist movement, imposed a revolutionary command council that wielded both executive and legislative powers. They also declared a state of emergency that would remain in force for the next 48 years, suspending many constitutional rights. The Ba’ath justified its rule in the name of Arab unity and socialism, but in practice it soon became a vehicle for authoritarian one-party control. A provisional constitution in 1964 proclaimed Syria a “socialist popular democratic republic” and cemented the Ba’ath’s dominance. Internal purges followed, and a more radical Ba’athist faction took over in 1966, deepening the regime’s repressive character.

By 1970, the leadership struggles within the Ba’ath culminated in a coup by General Hafez al-Assad, then Defense Minister. Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite officer, installed himself as strongman in what he dubbed the “Corrective Movement.” In 1971 he became president, and in 1973 he promulgated a new constitution that formally created a permanent one-party state. The 1973 constitution enshrined the Ba’ath Party as the “leader of the state and society” (Article 8), effectively eliminating genuine political competition. Although it provided lip service to principles like freedom and democracy in theory, in reality Assad’s Syria became a dictatorship. Parliament (the People’s Council) existed but was a rubber-stamp body; real power lay with Assad, the military and security apparatus, and the Ba’ath Party hierarchy.

Under Hafez al-Assad’s rule (1970–2000), Syria experienced decades of severe repression and human rights abuses. The regime tolerated no dissent: opposition figures were jailed, tortured, exiled, or “disappeared.” Censorship was total and the ubiquitous Mukhabarat (secret police) instilled fear in everyday life. The most notorious episode of brutality came in February 1982 in the city of Hama, where an Islamist uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood was met with overwhelming force. Government forces besieged Hama for weeks; between 10,000 and 40,000 people were killed or disappeared in what became known as the Hama massacre, with entire neighborhoods leveled. This massacre of civilians exemplified the lengths to which the Assad regime would go to crush opposition. Syrian society under Assad remained largely moderate and tolerant at the grassroots – sectarian strife was not a feature of everyday relations – but the regime itself exploited sectarian loyalties to entrench its rule. The elite core of the security forces was filled with Assad’s Alawite sect kin, and Alawite dominance in the army officer corps became pronounced, breeding some resentment. Nevertheless, open discussion of sectarian issues was taboo under the regime’s secular nationalist facade.

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father Hafez in 2000, there were brief hopes of liberalization (the “Damascus Spring”), but these hopes were quickly dashed. The younger Assad maintained the authoritarian system he inherited, and any initial openness was reversed. By the 2000s, Syria was effectively a family dictatorship, with Bashar, his relatives, and a clique of security chiefs monopolizing power. Elections were stage-managed plebiscites and the Ba’ath Party continued to hegemonize politics (even though Bashar tweaked the constitution in 2012 to remove the formal Article 8 monopoly, the reality of one-party rule did not fundamentally change). Freedom of expression remained non-existent; human rights reports documented numerous political prisoners and the use of torture. The Assad regime also developed a reputation for nepotism and corruption, with key economic sectors controlled by regime cronies. By early 2011, Syria was a pressure cooker of discontent – its people had endured decades of denied freedoms, and the winds of the Arab Spring sweeping the region would soon ignite a new revolt.

 

Uprising, Civil War, and the Fall of the Assad Regime (2011–2024)

In March 2011, peaceful protests for reform began in the southern city of Daraa, echoing uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere. Bashar al-Assad’s government responded to these demonstrations with violence, sparking a full-blown civil uprising. By 2012, Syria had descended into a horrific civil war. Over the next decade, the Assad regime – backed by allies Iran and Russia – waged a bloody campaign against a fragmented rebel opposition. The toll was devastating: entire cities were reduced to rubble, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were killed, and millions more displaced. The conflict took on a grim sectarian tinge at times (especially as extremist Islamist groups like ISIS emerged), but many analysts note that sectarian hatred was stoked and weaponized largely as a result of the war’s brutality, not its original cause. Through ruthless force, Assad managed to cling to power far longer than many expected, even as much of the country fell into chaos.

By 2023, the war had stalemated with Assad still controlling major cities (Damascus, Latakia, etc.) and rebels holding other pockets (notably Idlib province in the northwest). Few anticipated what would come next: in late 2024, the Assad regime suddenly collapsed with startling speed. The trigger was a renewed rebel offensive launched in northern Syria in November 2024, spearheaded by a coalition of opposition forces. On November 27, 2024, Islamist and nationalist rebels led by the group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), backed tacitly by Turkey, broke through regime front lines in Idlib province. Within days, they had captured the major city of Aleppo (Syria’s second-largest city) on November 30. The rebel advance was rapid and largely unexpected; after years of stalemate, the Syrian army’s defenses simply gave way. Many Syrian soldiers, demoralized by years of war and sensing the tide turning, deserted rather than fight. Some units reportedly “melted away” as whole groups of conscripts dropped their weapons and fled when faced with determined rebel assaults. Key Assad allies like Russia and Iran were notably absent or unwilling to prop him up this time, contributing to plummeting morale among regime forces.

As the opposition offensive swept south through Hama and Homs, panic gripped the regime. By the first week of December 2024, rebel units were at the doorstep of Damascus. On December 8, 2024, opposition fighters surged into the capital. In the early hours of that day, they declared Damascus “liberated” from Assad’s rule. Bashar al-Assad himself fled the city – his exact whereabouts uncertain – effectively relinquishing power. After 53 years of Assad family rule (dating back to Hafez’s 1970 coup), the regime was suddenly no more. Jubilant Syrians poured into the streets in parts of Damascus. At the iconic Umayyad Square, crowds celebrated amid chants and the waving of the tricolor Independence flag (the green-white-black flag with three red stars that had been adopted by the opposition as a symbol of the pre-Ba’ath republic).

Syrian citizens unfurl the three-starred Independence Flag (the symbol of Syria’s first republic) in central Damascus to celebrate the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. This flag, long associated with the opposition, was officially raised over government buildings after the regime’s collapse.

The sudden fall of Assad’s regime has been described as a “stunning collapse” that took the world by surprise. A 13-year civil war that had seemed intractable came to an abrupt end as rebel forces seized control of the apparatus of state. By December 9, 2024, what remained of the Syrian army announced that Assad’s 24-year rule was over, notifying units to stand down. The once-dominant Ba’ath Party was dissolved and the 2012 constitution suspended. For many Syrians, especially those who had risen up in 2011 only to face years of war, it was an almost unreal moment of victory – a dictator long thought invincible was gone, opening a path (however uncertain) to peace and freedom. Yet, enormous challenges lay ahead. The coalition that toppled Assad included Islamist factions (like HTS) whose vision for Syria may differ from that of liberal activists. The immediate priority became preventing a new round of infighting and chaos in the power vacuum.

 

Prospects for a Liberal and Democratic Syria After 2024

With the Assad regime’s demise, Syria stands at a historic crossroads. The country has a new opportunity to build the kind of liberal, democratic state that its forefathers envisioned over a century ago. The transitional authorities in Damascus – composed of opposition political leaders and rebel commanders – have expressed commitment to forming an inclusive government. In fact, the blueprint for a political transition has existed in international agreements for years (notably the 2012 Geneva Communiqué and UN Security Council Resolution 2254), which call for a Syrian-led transition, a new constitution, and free elections. With the hindrance of Assad removed, those plans can finally be put into motion. In late 2024, a Transitional Governing Body began to take shape, aiming to represent both the opposition forces and elements of the former regime willing to work toward democracy. The focus is on preventing a security vacuum and uniting the country’s diverse factions in a common project, so as to avoid the fate of other post-conflict states that descended into factional chaos. International actors – including the United Nations, Turkey, and Western countries – are cautiously engaging to support a stable transition, emphasizing the need for reconciliation and reconstruction rather than revenge.

Encouragingly, Syria’s new de facto leaders have made promising commitments. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist force that led much of the military campaign, has publicly pledged to respect equal rights for all Syrians, regardless of sect or ethnicity. HTS and others have spoken of decentralization and local autonomy as a way to reassure Syria’s many communities, and have even offered amnesty to former regime soldiers and officials – signals aimed at preventing an exodus of minorities or regime loyalists who might fear persecution. These assurances, if followed through, could help all Syrians feel they have a stake in the new order. Meanwhile, civil society groups and the Syrian diaspora are actively pushing for a say in the future constitution. A “national dialogue” process is expected, reminiscent of 1920 when Syrians of all stripes debated their constitution. This time, the hope is to enshrine modern democratic norms: protection of free speech, rule of law, separation of powers, and safeguards for pluralism and minority rights. Many Syrians are looking back to the 1920 and 1950 charters for inspiration, pointing out that concepts of religious freedom, equality, and personal liberty were part of Syria’s DNA from the start. Indeed, as one Syrian writer noted in early 2025, having finally rid themselves of “the executioner” (the Assad dictatorship), Syrians find it “inconceivable to give up any of the basic rights” that were championed a century ago.

Of course, the road ahead is fraught with difficulties. After so many years of conflict, Syria’s economy is shattered, its infrastructure wrecked, and social trust deeply frayed. There are rival armed groups that will need to be disarmed or integrated into a national army. Questions remain about how to address justice for the atrocities of the war – including chemical attacks, sieges, and mass torture – without derailing reconciliation. Another concern is the ideological balance of the new Syria: how to accommodate Islamists who fought on the front lines while still building a secular, liberal democratic system. Debates have already emerged, for example, on whether the future constitution should declare Syria an “Islamic” republic or simply the “Republic of Syria” without religious qualifiers. Syria’s tradition of moderate Islam and pluralism, especially in cities like Damascus and Aleppo, offers hope that a middle ground can be found, where the state remains neutral in religion and protects all faiths. The presence of veteran opposition technocrats and jurists in the transitional government (including some who were part of pre-2011 civil society movements) suggests a liberal vision still has strong advocates. As one analysis observed, despite the risks of renewed strife, Syria “has the potential to become the belated success of the Arab Spring, after a nightmarish 13 years”, even if it’s “a long shot”. In other words, if Syrians can unite around a shared blueprint for governance – much as they did in earlier eras – they might defy the odds and build a stable democracy.

The international community’s role will also be crucial. Thus far, regional powers that intervened in Syria’s war (such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf states) are recalibrating their positions. Russia and Iran, staunch Assad backers, have been sidelined by his fall and may lose influence, which could reduce external meddling. Countries like France, which historically had ties to Syria, have welcomed the regime’s fall and signaled support for the Syrian people’s democratic aspirations. The United States and Europe are likely to tie reconstruction aid to progress on political reform and human rights. If managed wisely, foreign aid and diplomacy could bolster the nascent institutions of Syrian democracy rather than undermine them. Nonetheless, Syrians themselves are keenly aware that nation-building is their responsibility. After enduring colonialism, dictatorships, and war, there is a widespread sentiment that Syria must reclaim its sovereignty in full – meaning decisions about its governance should be made by Syrians from across the country’s social spectrum. As a New York-based Syrian commentator wrote, “Syrians are finally and once again the authors of our destiny. We cannot go back to the darkness.”

In conclusion, the story of Syrian democracy from World War I to 2024 is a dramatic tale of hope, betrayal, perseverance, and renewal. A century ago, Syrians drafted one of the region’s most enlightened constitutions, only to see imperial forces snatch away their freedom. In the decades that followed, they experienced brief spells of democracy overshadowed by coups and then long decades of harsh authoritarian rule under the Assad family. Yet, the ideals of 1920 never completely died – they lived on in Syria’s collective memory of a tolerant, inclusive society. Now, with the fall of the Assad regime, those early ideals are resurfacing as guiding lights for the future. The task of building a liberal, democratic Syria will not be easy and is just beginning. But as history shows, the Syrian people have continually yearned for and fought for representative governance. From the national dialogue of 1920 that included Muslims and Christians side by side, to the brave protesters of 2011 who demanded dignity and freedom, to the diverse coalition that toppled a tyrant in 2024 – the commitment to democracy runs deep. If Syrians can channel that legacy of moderation, unity, and resilience, there is real hope that a new republic will rise: one that finally fulfills the promise of a government “of the people, by the people, for the people” in the heart of the Middle East.

 

Sources:

Elizabeth Thompson, How the West Stole Democracy from the Arabs: The Syrian Arab Congress of 1920 and the Destruction of its Historic Liberal-Islamic Alliance, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2020).

Sami Moubayed, “Syria’s Constitutional History: Past charters and future prospects,” Al Majalla, January 22, 2025. 

Danny Makki, “Why Sectarianism Fails to Explain the Conflict in Syria,” OpenDemocracy, February 5, 2017.

ConstitutionNet, “Constitutional History of Syria” – overview of Syria’s political developments.

Maya Gebeily, Suleiman Al-Khalidi, Ahmed Rasheed and Timour Azhari, “How Assad’s army collapsed in Syria: demoralised conscripts, absent allies,” Reuters, December 13, 2024.

“What happened in Syria? How did al-Assad fall?: Opposition forces have taken control of the capital after a significant offensive. Here is how it unravelled,” Al Jazeera, December 8, 2024

Marsin Alshamary et al., “The Assad regime falls. What happens now?” Brookings Institute, December 9, 2024. 

Rasha Elass, “A Century of Visions for Syria: With the country at a crossroads and a new constitution in the offing, a look back reveals how its people have worked to birth a modern Syrian state since Ottoman times,” New Lines Magazine, January 10, 2025.

Sarah El Deeb, “Why the rebel capture of Syria’s Hama, a city with a dark history, matters,” AP News, December 5, 2024. 

France Diplomacy, “Syria – Fall of Bachar al-Assad’s Regime (8 December 2024)” Ministere De L’Europe et Des Affaires Etrangeres.